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Evidence
by John E. Hall, Jr.*
W. Scott Henwood"
and Jacque Smith Clarke***
I. INTRODUCTION

This year represents the third full survey period during which the
"new" Georgia Evidence Code, Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.) title 24,1 is in effect. These new rules took effect on January 1,
2013.2 The rules conform in large part to the Federal Rules of Evidence
and have continued to change the face of evidence law in Georgia, which
continues to develop from last year. 3 This Survey highlights cases decided by the Georgia Court of Appeals and Georgia Supreme Court between June 1, 2015 and May 31, 2016 that have made an impact on evidence law in Georgia. This year's Article provides insight into the courts'
findings, particularly regarding spoliation, similar transaction evidence,
business records, and the best evidence rule. The Case Law Update also
provides an interesting update from last year's case law.
* Founding Partner in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1981); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 1984). Member, Mercer Law Review (1982-1984); Student Writing Editor (1983-1984). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
** Of Counsel in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State
University (B.B.A., 1976); Woodrow Wilson College of Law (J.D., 1978). Former Reporter of
Decisions for the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals. Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Hall Booth Smith, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia. Berry College
(B.S., 2010); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2013). Member, Mercer Law Review (2011-2013). Editorial Board Member, Journal of Southern Legal History
(2014). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. O.C.G.A. tit. 24 (2013).
2. Ga. H.R. Bill 24, Reg. Sess., 2011 Ga. Laws 99 (codified at O.C.G.A. tit. 24).
3. John E. Hall, Jr., W. Scott Henwood & Jacque Smith Clarke, Evidence, Annual
Survey of Georgia Law, 67 MERCER L. REV. 63 (2015). Special thanks to Blake McLemore
for his great research assistance with this year's Article.
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II. CASE LAW UPDATE
A review of last year's Survey shows some interesting appellate history. Last year's Survey discussed a similar transaction evidence case regarding prior DUI convictions called Frost v. State.4 That case was reversed by the Georgia Supreme Court in State v. Frost.5 The defendant,
Gary Frost, was charged with DUI less safe under O.C.G.A. § 40-6391(a)(1).6 The events leading up to the arrest are interesting. Frost, attempting to drive through the entrance of a Cobb County apartment complex early in the morning, struck the entry gate. Police arrived and found
Frost sitting in his vehicle-engine on and music blasting-drinking out
of a bottle of wine. 7
At the time of his arrest, Frost refused to submit to a breath test. Thus,
at trial, the State had no evidence concerning his Blood Alcohol Content
(BAC).8 To prove Frost had knowledge, "[t]he State proposed to present
evidence at trial that Frost had driven under the influence of alcohol in
Cobb County, on two occasions in 2009."9 The supreme court, upholding
the trial court's decision to admit this evidence and reversing the court
of appeals decision to exclude it, held that this specific situation is governed by the plain language of O.C.G.A. § 24-4-417.10 The court determined that the court of appeals defined the provision too narrowly, and
that this rule is a "rule of inclusion."11 Importantly, the court empha-

sized:
Rule 417 was not borrowed from the Federal Rules of Evidence, and it
was not carried over from our old Evidence Code. It is an original creation of the new Evidence Code, and to understand its meaning ... we
must fall back upon the usual principles that inform our consideration
of statutory meaning.12
The court then went on to interpret the plain language of the statute,
citing several reasons for its holding.1 3 No other new cases cited in last
year's Survey were reversed or questioned. New case law is organized
below by topic.

4.
5.
;6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

328 Ga. App. 337, 761 S.E.2d 875 (2014).
297 Ga. 296, 773 S.E.2d 700 (2015).
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-391(a)(1) (2013).
Frost, 297 Ga. at 297-98, 773, S.E.2d at 701.
Id. at 297-98, 773 S.E.2d at 701.
Id. at 298, 773 S.E.2d at 701.
Id. at 305-06, 773 S.E.2d at 706; O.C.G.A. § 24-4-417 (2013).
Frost, 297 Ga. at 300, 773 S.E.2d at 702.
Id. at 299, 773 S.E.2d at 702.
Id. at 303-06, 773 S.E.2d at 704-06.
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III. SPOLIATION

This period has provided new guidance on spoliation. In Phillips v.
Harmon,14 the Georgia Supreme Court vetoed the bright line test that
has been used to determine when the duty to preserve evidence starts. 1
The duty now starts when litigation is pending or "reasonably foreseeable
to that party."' 6 In this case, the plaintiff claimed medical malpractice
against several health care providers after her son experienced oxygen
deprivation during her labor. The defendants obtained a defense verdict,
and the trial court denied a motion for new trial. The court of appeals
reversed, and the defendants sought certiorari. 1
The specific evidence for which the plaintiffs claimed. spoliation was
the printed paper strips recording the results of electronic monitoring of
the child's heart rate. Though the hospital's regular practice was to maintain the record electronically along with nurses' notes, the strips themselves were only maintained for thirty days. The plaintiffs contended
there were nursing notations on the strips that were not part of the electronic record and requested the jury be instructed that the plaintiffs were
entitled to a presumption that the strips contained information prejudicial to the defendants.1 8 The trial court denied this instruction, and the
court of appeals reversed. The Georgia Supreme Court explained its reasoning regarding foreseeability by explaining that it may matter "what
the defendant did or did not do in response to the injury, including ...
investigation, the reasons for any notification of counsel and insurers,
and any expression by the defendant that it was acting in anticipation of
litigation."' 9 This decision means practitioners need to be proactive even
earlier to prevent spoliation claims.
IV. SIMILAR TRANSACTION EVIDENCE

A. The Bradshaw Test, Interpreted
This survey period presented multiple cases interpreting the Bradshaw 20 test when determining the admissibility of other acts evidence.
Under Bradshaw, the State must show (1) evidence of extrinsic acts is

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

297 Ga. 386, 774 S.E.2d 596 (2015).
Id. at 397-98, 774 S.E.2d at 605-06.
Id. at 396, 774 S.E.2d at 604.
Id. at 386-87, 774 S.E.2d at 598-99.
Id. at 394-95, 774 S.E.2d at 603.
Id. at 397, 774 S.E.2d at 605.
Bradshaw v. State, 296 Ga. 650, 769 S.E.2d 892 (2015).
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relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character; (2) the probative value of the other acts evidence is not substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice; and (3) there is sufficient proof that the jury could find
the defendant committed the act in question. 21 In State v. Jones,22 the
defendant was charged with DUI per se, DUI less safe, and speeding. 23
The State sought to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior conviction
of DUI less safe, asserting that this evidence was relevant to show the
defendant's intent and knowledge. The Georgia Supreme Court applied
the Bradshawtest to determine the admissibility of prior acts evidence. 24
Overruling the court of appeals, the court concluded that the evidence of
the defendant's prior DUI conviction was relevant to prove his intent "because [the evidence] had a tendency to make the existence of his general
intent to drive under the influence more probable and would authorize a
jury to logically infer that [the defendant] was voluntarily driving while
under the influence." 25 This ruling satisfies the first prong of the Bradshaw test. The court then remanded the case to the cou'rt of appeals to
consider the trial court's determination under Rule 403.26 Importantly,
the court explained that "Rule 404(b) .

.

. is, on its face, an evidentiary

rule of inclusion which contains a non-exhaustive list of purposes other
than bad character for which other acts evidence is deemed relevant and
may be properly offered. . . ."27

Importantly, this case settled the dispute over which law governs
when interpreting the new evidence rules. Thus, the federal interpretation of this rule of inclusion prevails, and admission will be fairly liberal
so long as the purpose for admission is not character propensity-based.
However, as highlighted in the case, Rule 403 acts as a backstop, and
courts can use their discretion when determining the admissibility of
prejudicial evidence. 28

21. Id. at 656, 769 S.E.2d at 896.
22. 297 Ga. 156, 773 S.E.2d 170 (2015).
23. Id. at 157, 773 S.E.2d at 171.
24. Id. at 158, 773 S.E.2d at 172.
25. Id. at 163, 773 S.E.2d at 175.
26. Id. at 164, 773 S.E.2d at 176.
27. Id. at 159, 773 S.E.2d at 173 (emphasis added).
28. Id. at 163, 773 S.E.2d at 175. For more on this holding, see D. Victor Reynolds,
GeorgiaIndebted to Its Supreme Court for Evidence Decision, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP.,
July 16, 2015.
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B. Other Acts Evidence, a Reversed Murder Conviction, and State of
Mind Analysis
A very interesting case from the survey period involves a murder conviction that was reversed due to the trial court's error in admitting other
acts evidence. 29 The appellant was charged and convicted of malice murder in connection with the death of a security guard at a Hormel meat
packing plant in 1976.30 The appellant shot the victim in the back seven
times after binding him down with belts and a shirt. At trial, the State
sought to introduce evidence showing that the appellant and an accomplice murdered a Mississippi state trooper in 1983, claiming this evidence
was admissible to prove identity, motive, and course of conduct. The trial
court agreed and admitted the evidence. 31
The Georgia Supreme Court cited Jones and Bradshaw, infra, ruling
that the State must satisfy the three-prong test (articulated above) to
determine whether the other acts evidence is admissible. 32 Prong three
was satisfied by the appellant's guilty plea. The key issue involved relevance of the other acts evidence, and the court broke down each reason
for admission asserted by the State individually.33 To admit for purposes
of identity under the new Georgia Evidence Code, the State must show
that the extrinsic act was a "signature crime," involving acts so similar
that they are classified as the "handiwork of the appellant." 34
The court explained that when examining other acts evidence, it must
consider both the similarities and dissimilarities. 35 Here, the crimes were
too dissimilar to allow admission of the prior murder evidence, and the
evidence was also not admissible to show motive (this was very straightforward reasoning).3 6 The court then emphasized a key difference between our old evidence law and the new Evidence Code, explaining that
the "'course of conduct' and 'bent-of-mind' exceptions . .. have been eliminated from the new Evidence Code."37 Ultimately, the court ruled that
the trial court's error in admitting this other acts evidence was extremely

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Brooks v. State, 298 Ga. 722, 783 S.E.2d 895 (2016).
Id. at 722, 783 S.E.2d at 897.
Id. at 723-24, 783 S.E.2d at 898.
Id. at 724, 783 S.E.2d at 898.
Id.
Id. at 725, 783 S.E.2d at 899.
Id.
Id. at 726-27, 783 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 727, 783 S.E.2d at 900.
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prejudicial and not harmless, justifying reversal of the appellant's murder conviction. 38 Interestingly, the court did not specifically examine the
"course of conduct" argument and only stated that it was left out of the
new Code, 39 though the new Code does allow other acts evidence for
"other purposes"-a sort of catchall provision-and explicitly states that
the reasons listed in the rule are not exclusive. 40
Another very interesting case from this survey period also addressed
evidence of other acts. State v. Brown 41 involved the court of appeals vacating trial court verdicts of acquittal for the defendants on charges of
trafficking in cocaine, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute,
and other violations. 42 Importantly, this court vacated the exclusion of
evidence of other crimes and remanded the issue back to the trial court
because the trial court failed to exercise its discretion when considering
the purpose for admission of the other crimes evidence. 43 The other
crimes at issue involved a 2005 incident in which both defendants were
seen by a police officer cutting crack cocaine, and officers eventually
seized 137 grams of crack cocaine and 11 grams of marijuana. 44 The other
incident occurred in 2009, where officers found 8.1 grams of marijuana
on the person of the defendant, Brown. 45
The trial court erred in excluding this evidence, which the State argued was admissible to show intent, because the trial court failed to consider and compare the relevant states of mind involved with the extrinsic
acts and the act at issue. 46 Essentially, the court explains the standard
under the new evidence code that a trial court must use when considering
extrinsic offense evidence offered to show intent. 47The most interesting
part of this case is the concurrence written by Judge McFadden.4 8 He
stated: "I write separately to lament the ease with which this spectaclean unauthorized criminal trial that the prosecutor was compelled to boycott leading to ineffective acquittals that an appellate court must unwind-could have been avoided." 49 In short, the court of appeals seems to

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 727-28, 783 S.E.2d at 900.
Id. at 727, 783 S.E.2d at 900.
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-404 (2013).
333 Ga. App. 643, 777 S.E.2d 27 (2015).
Id. at 643, 777 S.E.2d at 29.
Id. at 656, 657, 777 S.E.2d at 37, 39.
Id. at 654, 777 S.E.2d at 36.
Id.
Id. at 656-57, 777 S.E.2d at 37-38.
Id. at 655, 777 S.E.2d at 37.
Id. at 658, 777 S.E.2d at 39.
Id.
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be clearly articulating how the trial courts must apply the new Evidence
Code-particularly the state of mind of the defendant when considering
whether to admit evidence of extrinsic acts.
C. The Importance of Truthfulness Analysis in Other Acts Admissibility
In Gaskin v. State,5 0 the court of appeals clarified that evidence of prior
arrests is properly admitted to rebut character testimony only when
those prior arrests involve an element of truthfulness.5 1 This case involved a defendant's motion for a new trial following a conviction of two
counts of child molestation being denied by the trial court, and the court
of appeals reversed because the trial court improperly admitted evidence
of the defendant's prior arrests. 52
The key issue addressed by the court of appeals involved the State's
method of attacking the credibility of the defense witness, the victim's
mother. 53 The witness testified to the defendant's reputation in the community as truthful, which was proper reputation testimoiy.54 The trial
court then allowed the State, on cross-examination of the defense witness, to inquire into the witness's knowledge regarding the defendant's
prior arrests. 5 5 This court ruled that the trial court erred in allowing in-

quiry into these specific acts because the new Code requires this type of
attack to involve specific instances that are probative of truthfulness or
untruthfulness.56
The prior arrests included possession, manufacturing, or distribution
of marijuana; simple battery; criminal damage to property; and obstruction of a person making a 911 call.5 7 The court of appeals explained that
none of these specific instances were probative of truthfulness because
these crimes do not involve acts of truthfulness or untruthfulness (unlike,
for example, perjury, forgery, and fraud).58 The court continued, stating,
"the State's questions regarding the specific crimes involved in the arrests constituted an improper attempt to use impeachment as a guise for
presenting otherwise inadmissible evidence to the jury."5 9 The error in

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

334 Ga. App. 758, 780 S.E.2d 426 (2015).
Id. at 761-62, 780 S.E.2d at 429.
Id. at 758, 780 S.E.2d at 427.
Id. at 760, 780 S.E.2d at 428.
Id.
Id. at 761, 780 S.E.2d at 429.
Id. at 763, 780 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 761, 780 S.E.2d at 429.
Id. at 763, 780 S.E.2d at 430.
Id.
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allowing this evidence to be presented to the jury was not harmless; thus,
60
the denial of the defendant's motion for new trial was reversed.
D. Evidence of Other Sex Crimes Continues to be Admissible
Evidence of other sex crimes has been, and continues to be, admissible
under Georgia law, and thus, sex crimes are an exception to the traditional other acts analysis. The statute provides, "[i]n a criminal proceeding in which the accused is accused of an offense of sexual assault, evidence of the accused's commission of another offense of sexual assault
shall be admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant." 61 In Edmonson v. State,62 the defendant was convicted of false imprisonment and aggravated sodomy, and the issue on
appeal concerned the admission of evidence of the defendant's prior sexual conduct.6 3 This case involved sexual misconduct by the defendant
with a minor (the details are shocking), and the prior conduct involved
sexual acts with another minor. 64 The State sought to introduce this evidence to show the defendant's intent or plan "to seek out vulnerable
young women, who are medium-to-short-build African-Americans who
65
are slightly overweight, and exploit them in sexual ways." This court

did not even address whether the trial court erred in admitting the other
sexual misconduct evidence, reasoning that any error was harmless be66
cause of the great amount of evidence against the defendant. The court
did, however, note that this evidence may have been admissible under
another evidence statute, O.C.G.A. § 24-4-413,67 which would make the
66
challenge to the trial court's admission of this evidence moot.

V.

BUSINESS RECORDS

An interesting case from the survey period articulated some business
records admissibility guidelines. In Ciras, LLC v. Hydrajet Technology,
LLC,6 9 the court of appeals reversed a trial court's exclusion of business

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 763-64, 780 S.E.2d at 430-31.
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-413 (2013).
336 Ga. App. 621, 785 S.E.2d 563 (2016).
Id. at 621, 785 S.E.2d at 564.
Id. at 621-22, 785 S.E.2d at 564-65.
Id. at 623, 785 S.E.2d at 565.
Id. at 623-24, 785 S.E.2d at 565-66.
O.C.G.A. § 24-4-413.
Edmonson, 336 Ga. App. at 626, 785 S.E.2d at 567.
333 Ga. App. 498, 773 S.E.2d 800 (2015).
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records at trial. 70 Plaintiff sought to prove damages by offering an affidavit to authenticate bank records regarding the pertinent loan account.71
The court followed federal precedent, noting that "[i]t is not necessary
that the person who actually prepared the business record testify, nor
that the document be prepared by the business which has custody of it,
so long as other circumstantial evidence suggests the trustworthiness of
the record." 72
VI. HEARSAY
A. Prior ConsistentStatements
This period also gave some guidance on hearsay in the prior consistent
statements realm. In Walters v. State,73 the defendant was charged with
aggravated assault and possession of a knife during the commission of a
felony. 74 The evidence at issue involved the testimony of the responding
police officer who testified about the victim's statements to him regarding
the incident.75 The court provided an explanation of how the new Georgia
Code provides a statute governing the admission of prior consistent statements, which was not so prior to the adoption of the new Code. 76 The
defendant argued that the evidence constituted improper bolstering;
thus, the court began comparing the old rules developed through case law
with the new Code regarding this issue.77 Essentially, the inquiry on
whether to admit prior consistent statements no longer ends after determining whether a defendant impugned a witness's credibility by charging her with recent fabrication or improper influence or motive.78 Instead,
the court must consider whether the witness's credibility was attacked
on other grounds.79 Here is a great quote summarizing the court's perspective:

70. Id. at 498, 773 S.E.2d at 802.
71. Id. at 498, 773 S.E.2d at 801.
72. Id. at 500, 773 S.E.2d at 802 (quoting United States v. Hawkins, 905 F.2d 1489,
1494 (11th Cir. 1990)). See also Triple T-Bar, LLC v. DDR Se. Springfield, 330 Ga. App.
847, 769 S.E.2d 586 (2015) (holding that business records were properly authenticated by
a representative of a successor company).
73. 335 Ga. App. 12, 780 S.E.2d 720 (2015).
74. Id. at 12, 780 S.E.2d at 721.
75. Id. at 13, 780 S.E.2d at 722.
76. Id. at 14, 780 S.E.2d at 723.
77. Id. at 15-16, 780 S.E.2d at 724.
78. Id. at 14, 780 S.E.2d at 723.
79. Id.
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According to its plain terms, this new rule allows the admission of
prior consistent statements if they logically rebut any attack on a witness's credibility, except for attacks upon his character for truthfulness or evidence of his prior convictions. Accordingly, our inquiry is
not limited to asking whether [the defendant] impugned [the victim's]
credibility by charging her with recent fabrication or improper influence or motive. We must also consider whether [the defendant] attacked [the victim's] credibility on other grounds. Pre-OCGA § 24-6613 precedent is of little help in addressing this question because our
definition of what constituted an attack on credibility was narrower
then. We therefore turn to federal law. ("[W]here the new Georgia
rules mirror their federal counterparts, it is clear that the General Assembly intended for Georgia courts to look to the federal rules and how
80
federal appellate courts have interpreted those rules for guidance.")
Ultimately, the victim's credibility was attacked because the defense
counsel "suggest[ed] that she had misidentified [the defendant's] weapon
during her 911 call and that her account of the events was not believable
81
due to her heightened emotional state." Thus, the victim's prior consistent statements were admissible because they logically rebutted this
attack.82 On a side note, the court broke down the victim's testimony into
portions and ultimately ruled that one portion was admissible, while the
other portion was left unaddressed because the admission, if error, would
83
have been harmless.
VII. BEST EVIDENCE RULE
An interesting case from the survey period demonstrates a contempo84
rary application of the best evidence rule. In Patch v. State, Phillip
Patch appealed his convictions for three counts of computer or electronic
pornography and child exploitation, arguing, among other things, that
the trial court erred by allowing testimony of a police officer who identified Patch as the person responsible for using the Yahoo! account at issue. 85 This case involved a police officer, Stephen Land, who was investigating internet crimes against children by creating a Yahoo! profile
88
posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. Another account, allegedly operated

80.
S.E.2d
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 14-15, 780 S.E.2d at 723 (quoting Parker v. State, 296 Ga. 586, 592, 769
329, 333 (2015) (internal citations omitted)).
Id. at 17, 780 S.E.2d at 724.
Id. at 17, 780 S.E.2d at 725.
See id. at 17-18, 780 S.E.2d at 725.
337 Ga. App. 233, 786 S.E.2d 882 (2016).
Id. at 233, 238, 786 S.E.2d at 883, 887.
Id. at 233, 786 S.E.2d at 884.
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by Patch, contacted Land's fake account and began sending sexual messages and revealing himself to Land's account via webcam. Importantly,
Patch, or whoever was using the account to contact Land, was told that
the girl on the other end was fourteen.87 Patch never showed his face in
the webcam videos.8 8 In order to identify Patch as the account user, the
State introduced testimony of another officer, Richard Peluso, who conducted a similar operation involving sexual internet misbehavior by
Patch, directed towards another account posing as that of a thirteenyear-old girl.89 Patch actually showed his face on the webcam during this
investigation.90
Patch argued that Peluso's testimony on this other incident was inadmissible because it only established a fact an average juror could decide.91
The Georgia Court of Appeals went into an analysis of the new Georgia
Evidence Code and the new statutes governing the best evidence rule.
Ultimately, the court ruled that this secondary evidence fit squarely
within the exception requiring the original webcam videos and photos,
because those videos were destroyed due to a hard drive malfunction, and
not by any bad faith on the part of the State. 92 Thus, the secondary evidence, Peluso's testimony, was admissible, and the originals were not required.93 Further, both parties relied on old Georgia case law when making their arguments, and the court highlighted that this was improper
and the new Code applied. 94
VIII. CONCLUSION
This survey period, once again, produced interesting decisions that
continue to shape the state of evidence law in Georgia. Appellate decisions continue to show how the new provisions apply, and appellate
courts are regularly holding attorneys to the new rules. The courts have,
once again, actively changed and shaped the admissibility standards in
multiple categories of evidence law during this period.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 233-34, 786 S.E.2d at 884.
Id.
Id. at 238-39, 786 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 239, 786 S.E.2d at 887.
Id. at 240, 786 S.E.2d at 888.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 240-41, 786 S.E.2d at 888-89.
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